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Foreword
This paper gives a quantitative explanation of the effect of trade liberalization on
Price-Cost Margins (PCM hereafter) in Indian industries. Cross-country studies reveal
that import competition causes markups in profit margins to fall. This can be explained
by two econometric approaches-one using PCM and the other using Output Growth Rate.
Both the approaches yield similar econometric evidence leading us to believe that import
competition leads to a fall in PCM in imperfectly competitive industries. Theoretically
under the static profit maximization principle as import barriers are removed \ reduced
the elasticity of demand would increase due to increased availability of imported good
leading to a fall in the PCM. At times, particularly in the short run import liberalization
may  lead  to  increased  efficiency  and  competence,  having  a  favourable  effect  on
profitability.
This paper focuses, in particular, on the effect of post-1991 trade liberalization on
the PCM in Indian industries and is a pioneering step in studying the effect through an
econometric model. The author gives an industry wise comparison of the PCM, based on
researches done by various researchers using dummy and explanatory variables which
suggests that trade liberalization influenced the impact of exports, R & D et al.  Studies
also reveal the growth of industry output and industrial concentrations are significant
determinants of profitability. However the studies have overlooked the influence of tariff
and  non-tariff  barriers.  The  authors  have  used  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers,  labour
productivity and growth rate of industry as explanatory variables to study PCM.
The  econometric  analysis  uses  two  models  of  panel  data-Fixed  and  Random
effects models based on the Kmenta Model. Analysis of PCM at the aggregate level
reveals that there was no fall after 1991, rather there has been an increase, which may be
attributed to fall in labour’s share in the value added.
The authors have constructed a quantitative model for estimating and explaining
PCM from panel data keeping in view the tariff and non-tariff variables. This leads them
to conclude that reduced tariffs have pro-competitive effects on Indian industries and that
there was a significant reduction in labour share in value added. They also state that the
trade unions have become weaker and are facing a slack in real product wage.
It is hoped that this illuminating piece of work will provide better understanding
of the industry implications of the liberalization regime and will help the economy to
strategically formulate its stand on tariff negotiations.
We are very grateful to the IDBI & IFCI for financial support for this research.
Arvind Virmani
Director & Chief Executive
ICRIER
April 2004ii
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Abstract
Using panel data for 137 three-digit industries for the period 1980-81 to 1997-98,
the  paper  examines  the  effect  of  trade  liberalization  on  price-cost  margins  in  Indian
industries. An econometric model is estimated to explain variations in price-cost margins,
in which the tariff and non-tariff barriers are included among the explanatory variables.
Thus,  inter-industrial  and  inter-temporal  variations  in  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers  on
manufactured imports are employed to assess the effect of trade liberalization on price-
cost margins in domestic industries. The results of the analysis clearly indicate that the
lowering of tariff and removal of quantitative restrictions on imports of manufactures in
the 1990s had a significant pro-competitive effect on Indian industries, tending to reduce
the markups or price-cost margins. The paper notes at the same time that in spite of the
pro-competitive  effects  of  trade  liberalization  reinforced  by  domestic  industrial
deregulation,  the  price-cost  margins  in  manufacturing  did  not  fall  in  the  post-reform
period. Rather, there was an increase in the margin in most industry groups as well as at
the aggregate manufacturing level. An analysis of trends in labor income in industries
brings out that in the post-reform period there has been a marked fall in the growth rate of
real wages and a significant reduction in labor’s income share in value added, reflecting
perhaps  a  weakening  of  industrial  labor’s  bargaining  power.  This  seems  to  have
neutralized to a large extent the depressing effect of trade liberalization on the price-cost
margins in Indian industries.
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Trade Liberalization and Price-cost Margin in Indian Industries
I  Introduction
A number of studies for developing countries have found that increased exposure
to import competition causes markups or profit margins in industries to fall, with the
largest  effect  being  in  the  highly  concentrated  industries  and  in  large  plants.
1  These
include studies  undertaken  for  Chile,  Columbia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  and  Turkey.  That
import competition reduces markups has been found also in two recent cross-country
studies, covering both developed and developing countries (Hoekman et al., 2001; Kee
and Hoekman, 2003).
Two  approaches  have  been  taken  to  examine  the  effect  of  increased  import
competition on markups in industries.  In one approach, the price-cost margin (PCM)
(defined as the ratio of sales net of expenditure on labor and intermediate inputs over
sales) is used as an indicator of the markup, and it is regressed on a set of explanatory
variables including variables representing the level of import competition. In the other
approach, the methodology developed by Hall (1988) is used.  It involves regression of
output growth rate on a share-weighted growth rate of inputs, the regression yielding the
markup as the slope coefficient.  By allowing the coefficient to vary over time, one can
test whether import competition affects markup.
2  The empirical results that have been
obtained  by  the  two  approaches  largely  point  in  the  same  direction,  and  a  general
conclusion that may be drawn from the econometric evidence is that increased exposure
to import competition leads to a reduction in price-cost margin or markup in imperfectly
competitive industries. In other words, import competition disciplines domestic firms in
imperfectly competitive industries.
                                                
1  See,  for  instance,  Roberts  and  Tybout  (1996),  and  Currie  and  Harrison  (1997).  For  a  review  of
literature, see Tybout (2001) and Epifani (2003).
2  Hoekman et al. (2001) apply the structural regression approach of Hall to estimate the average industry
markup for different countries, which are then used in a regression analysis relating markup to import
penetration and other explanatory variables.  Currie and Harrison (1997) regress output growth on input
growth, the tariff and non-tariff barriers and interaction terms involving input growth and the import
barriers, thereby estimating jointly the markups, and the effect of trade barriers on productivity and
markups.2
A  theoretical  explanation  for  the  observed  phenomenon  can  be  provided  by
linking the removal/reduction of import barriers to the elasticity of demand for products
of domestic firms (Tybout, 2001). Under the assumption of static profit maximization,
the  price  set  by  a  firm  operating  in  an  imperfectly  competitive  market  as  a  ratio  to
marginal cost is a decreasing function of the elasticity of demand. Let p denote price, c
marginal  cost  and  h  elasticity  of  demand,  then  the  relationship  between  markup  and
elasticity of demand may be written as (Tybout, 2001):
As import barriers are removed/reduced, the elasticity of demand would increase
because of increased availability of imported goods, fall in the tariff-inclusive price of
such goods to domestic consumers and enlargement of product variety, and this would in
turn lead to a fall in the markup.
If  one  considers  instead  a  theoretical  framework  typified  by  a  collusive
equilibrium  rather  than  static  profit  maximization,  then  a  theoretical  argument  for
expecting import liberalization to make markups fall is that cooperative behavior may
become unsustainable in such an environment (Tybout, 2001).  Maintaining collusive
equilibrium  may  become  difficult  after  imports  are  liberalized  because  import
liberalization  changes  the  pay-off  to  defecting,  or  changes  firms’  ability  to  punish
defectors or makes defection hard to detect.
It  should  be  pointed  out  here  that  even  though  import  liberalization  leads  to
greater competition, it need not always have an adverse effect on profitability (price-cost
margin)  of  industrial  firms  (there  is  such  a  possibility  at  least  in  the  short-run).  The
reasons  are  that  the  firms  may  increase  efficiency  (through  introduction  of  advanced
technology or restructuring into the areas of their core competence) or the firms may














have a favorable effect on profitability.  Further, increase in import penetration may lead
to mergers among the foreign and domestic firms in concentrated markets. Evidently,
though there are strong theoretical arguments for expecting trade liberalization to lead to
lower  profit  margins  in  concentrated  industries,  and  the  proposition  also  has  good
empirical support, this need not happen in all cases.  For instance, in a study of the effect
of trade liberalization on profitability in Turkish manufacturing industry, Yalcin (2000)
finds that import penetration led to a decrease in the price-cost margin in private sector
firms in general, but the price-cost margin in highly concentrated private sector industries
increased instead of going down.
The object of this paper is to analyze the effect of post-1991 trade liberalization in
India on price-cost margins in Indian industries.
3 India has undertaken a major reform of
trade policies since 1991 with large reductions made in tariff and non-tariff barriers on
imports of industrial products,
4 and accordingly a study of the pro-competitive effects of
these reforms would be useful and interesting. There is a  growing body of empirical
economic literature on the effects of post-1991 industrial and trade reforms in India on
the  performance  of  industrial  firms,  especially  on  industrial  productivity.
5    By
comparison, there has been relatively much less research on the effect of the reforms on
markups or price-cost margins in Indian industries. The present paper makes an attempt
to fill this gap in the literature. To this end, an econometric analysis of the effect of trade
liberalization on price-cost margin in Indian industries is undertaken using panel data for
137 three-digit industries covering the period 1980-81 to 1997-98.
                                                
3  The analysis is confined to the organized industrial sector comprising industrial units that employ 10 or
more workers with power or 20 or more workers without power.
4  For a discussion on India’s economic reforms since 1991, see Joshi and Little (1996), among others.
5  Balakrishnan  et  al.  (2000)  and  Topalova  (2003)  have  studied  the  effect  of  trade  liberalization  on
industrial  productivity  using  firm-level  data  for  Indian  manufacturing.  Epifani  (2003)  has  recently
reviewed the studies on the effect of economic reforms on the performance of Indian industries based
on firm-level data. Apart from these, there have been a number of studies which have used industry-
level data to examine the effects of industrial and trade reforms on industrial performance in India (for
example,  Das,  1998,  2001,  2003b;  Aghion  et  al.,  2003;  Goldar  and  Kumari,  2003;  Pattnayak  and
Thangavelu, 2003).4
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  briefly  the
findings of some recent studies on markups or profitability in Indian industries. Section 3
discusses the model applied for the analysis, the estimation technique, the data sources
and the construction of variables used for this study. The empirical results are presented
in Section 4, which begins with an analysis of trends in price-cost margin and labor
income in Indian industries in the 1980s and 1990s, followed by the estimates of the
model. Section 5 summarizes the main findings of the study and concludes.
II  Findings of Earlier Studies
Krishna and Mitra (1998) in their study covering four Indian industries find that
in the post-reform period markup declined significantly in three out of four industries.
The decrease was to such a level as the markup parameter for firms dropped to a value
less than one, i.e. the firms would incur losses.  They rationalize this finding on the
grounds that ‘in the presence of adjustment and sunk costs a firm may lose money while
it adapts to a new trading environment’.
6
In contrast, the study undertaken by Srivastava et al. (2001), based on company-
level data for the period 1980 to 1997, finds that the markup increased in the post-reform
period  in  publishing  and  printing,  leather  products,  food  products,  rubber  and  plastic
products, motor vehicles, and electrical machinery. The explanation given is that these
are generally consumer goods and consumer durables producing sectors with very limited
foreign  competition  during  the  period  studied.  The  markup  declined  in  non-metallic
mineral products, basic metals and paper products. The squeeze in the markup for metals
and  non-metallic  mineral  products  is  attributed  to  increased  domestic  and  foreign
competition.  For textiles, machinery and fabricated metal products, no change in markup
is found. Thus, the results of the study indicate that despite large reductions in tariff and
non-tariff barriers on imports of industrial products, a reduction in markups did not take
place in the post-reform period in most Indian industries (Annex A presents the estimates
                                                
6  In  industries  marked  by  large  sunk  entry  cost,  unexpected  foreign  competition  may  cut  into  the
revenues  that  firms  had  expected  to  earn  to  cover  their  entry  cost  (rather  than  merely  squeezing
monopoly profits), making them sorry ex-post that they had entered (Tybout, 2001).5
of mark-up obtained in the study). However, in certain industries, import liberalization
did have a significant adverse effect on profitability of Indian firms.
While  Krishna  and  Mitra  (1998)  and  Srivastava  et  al.  (2001)  have  used  the
structural regression approach of Hall for studying of the effect of economic reforms on
markups  in  Indian  industries,  Kambhampati  and  Parikh  (2003)  have  taken  the  other
approach, i.e. estimating a regression equation in which price-cost margin is taken as the
dependent variable. They use data for 281 firms for the period 1980 to 1998. Analyzing
trends in profit (price-cost) margins, they find that in firms with above average export
intensity  (exports  to  sales  ratio  over  4.5  percent),  the  profit  margin  increased  during
1992-98 as compared to 1980-90, but in relatively less export-oriented firms the profit
margin went down. The fall was from 20 percent during 1980-90 to 9 percent during
1992-98.
For  the  regression  analysis,  Kambhampati  and  Parikh  have  used  a  dummy
variable to capture the effect of trade reforms (the dummy variable being based on time-
periods, pre and post-reform, captures the effects of industrial and other policy reforms as
well). Export intensity, import intensity, R&D intensity, capital-output ratio, and market
share  are  among  the  explanatory  variables  used.  The  dummy  variable  enters  the
regression equation separately as well as in interaction with other explanatory variables.
The results indicate that the effect of liberalization on profitability was mainly through its
impact on other firm variables, particularly market share, advertising, R&D and exports.
While exports had a pro-competitive effect, advertising and R&D caused profitability to
increase. The results of the analysis thus suggest that while trade liberalization per se had
a pro-competitive effect, it changed the impact of exports, R&D and advertisement on
profitability and thus the overall effect on price-cost margins may have been positive for
certain sections of the domestic industry.
In comparison with the above three studies, the study of profitability of Indian
industries undertaken by Rao (2001) is more detailed. The work of Rao, like Srivastava et
al. (2001), is based on company-level data taken from the Prowess database of the CMIE6
(Center for Monitoring  Indian Economy, Mumbai).  In  her  analysis  of  profitability  of
industrial  companies,  she  includes  variables  like  concentration  ratio,  market  share,
advertising-sales ratio, growth rate of industry, export-sales ratio, import-sales ratio, etc.
Panel data for a total of 1458 companies belonging to six industries (three producer goods
industries and three consumer goods industries) for the period 1990-91 to 1998-99 are
used  for  the  analysis.  For  the  selected  industries,  she  finds  dismal  profitability
performance by firms in post-reform period.  Her econometric results show that growth
of industry output and industrial concentration are statistically significant determinants of
firm profitability in India. External trade is found to be playing a significant role only in
producer’s goods industries where reduction in import duties has been relatively higher.
One limitation common to the four studies spoken of above is that the tariff and
non-tariff barriers have not been directly included in the analysis as variables affecting
markups  or  profitability.    In  this  paper,  we  use  tariff  rates  and  non-tariff  barriers  as
explanatory variables in the regression equations estimated to explain price-cost margin,
thereby  employing  inter-temporal  and  across-industry  variation  in  trade  protection
measures  to  identify  the  effect  of  trade  policies.  This  is,  needless  to  say,  far  more
satisfactory  than  employing  a  post-reform  dummy  variable  as  Krishna-Mitra,
Kambhampati-Parikh and Srivastava et al. have done.
 7
III  Model, Data and Variables
III.1  The Model
As mentioned earlier, we use an industry-level panel data set for the econometric
analysis (discussed further in Section 3.3). The variable of interest is price-cost margin,
and the aim of the analysis is to find out whether trade liberalization had a significant
pro-competitive effect, reducing price-cost margins in Indian industries.
                                                
7  The advantage of including tariff and not-tariff barriers in the analysis, rather than using a dummy of
post- reform period, has been noted by Goldar and Kumari (2003) and Topalova (2003).7
If  it  is  assumed  that  unit  expenditures  on  labor  and  intermediate  inputs  are
constant with respect to output, then the price-cost margin is a monotonic transformation
of the markup. It can also be shown that the price-cost margin is current economic profit
over sales plus the competitive return to capital over revenue (Tybout, 2001).  Thus, the













where p denotes profits, r market return on capital, d depreciation rate, K capital,
p price and q quantity produced.  In industries where competition drives economic profits
to zero, the variables representing import competition should contribute nothing to the
explanation of variations in PCM after controlling for the ratio of capital stock to output.
On the other hand, if economic profits are present, then increased import competition
should lower PCM by increasing price elasticity or by destroying collusive equilibria
(Tybout, 2001).  Accordingly, the basic model used in studies on the effect of import
competition  on  PCM  based  on  industry-level  data  typically  takes  the  following  form
(Epifani, 2003):
Here, Hjt is the Herfindahl index (an index of industry structure that is inversely
related to the degree of competition) and IMPjt is the import penetration ratio (reflecting
import competition). The pro-competitive effect of trade liberalization should show up in
a negative coefficient of the import penetration variable. The interaction term Hjt¼IMPjt
allows  one  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  if  highly  concentrated  industries  enjoy  above
normal profits because of market power, the adverse  effect of import competition on
profitability should be greater for such industries. Thus, the coefficient of the interaction
term should be negative. The capital-output ratio controls for inter-industry differences in
capital  intensity,  while  Ij  and  Tt  are  industry  and  time  dummies,  capturing  industry-
specific and time-specific effects.
) 3 ...( ) , , / , , , ( t j jt jt jt jt jt jt jt T I q K IMP H IMP H f PCM ¼ =8
The model we use for our analysis is somewhat different from the one in equation
(3) above though the underlying relationships between variables are the same. The model
may be written as:
where MB denotes import barriers, LP denotes labor productivity and DCON is a
dummy  variable  representing  industrial  concentration  (taking  value  one  for  highly
concentrated industries, zero otherwise). X is the vector of other variables used in the
estimated model, which are expected to influence price-cost margin in industries.
Since the analysis is undertaken at three-digit industry level and no estimates of
industrial  concentration  (e.g.,  Herfindahl  index)  are  readily  available  at  that  level  of
industrial  disaggregation,  we  have  used  a  dummy  variable,  DCON,  in  the  model  to
capture the effect of market power on profitability. We use for this purpose the estimates
of industrial concentration in India made by Kambhampati (1996). DCON is assigned
value one for industries for which Kambhampati’s estimates indicate relatively high level
of concentration, otherwise it is assigned value zero.
To capture the effect of import competition, tariff rates and non-tariff barriers
(import coverage ratio) have been used. Since we did not get good results when capital-
output ratio was included in the regression as an explanatory variable, we have replaced it
by labor productivity (measured by real value added per employee).  Labor productivity
should bear a strong positive correlation with capital intensity and would therefore be a
good  proxy.  Another  advantage  of  using  labor  productivity  is  that  the  effect  of
productivity advances on profitability would be captured by this variable.
Besides the three variables mentioned above, we have used two other explanatory
variables. These are growth rate of the industry (in terms of real output) and the deviation
of income share of labor from estimated elasticity of real value added with respect to
labor (based on an estimated production function).
) 4 ...( ) , , , , ( jt jt jt j jt j jt X LP MB DCON MB DCON f PCM ¼ =9
Following Ghose (1975), Kambhampati (1996) and Rao (2001), we have included
growth  rate  of  the  industry  as  an  explanatory  variable  in  the  model.  Similar  to  the
arguments  given  by  Kambhampati  (1996),  who  included  lagged  growth  rate  as  an
explanatory  variable,  Rao  (2001)  has  argued  that  higher  growth  rate  might  result  in
increased efficiency leading to increased profit margins for the firm. She has found a
strong positive relationship between output growth and profitability for Indian industries
in the 1990s. However, Ghose (1975) found strong empirical support for the Baumol
(1962) assertion that fast growth of an industry attracts new entrants because barriers to
entry are less in an expanding market, which reduces the level of concentration and thus
the profitability of firms. Higher growth rate of industry may also depress profitability
either through fall in product prices or through rise in input prices.
As regards the deviation of income share of labor from estimated elasticity of real
value  added  with  respect  to  labor,  this  variable,  in  our  opinion,  reflects  how  inter-
temporal  changes  in  labor’s  income  share  in  value  added  may  influence  price-cost
margins. In his study of the effect of trade liberalization on price-cost margin in Turkish
manufacturing industry, Yalcin (2000) points out that the effect of import competition on
the  price-cost  margin  may  be  clouded  by  the  influence  of  several  other  factors.    In
particular, he notes that a fall in labor’s income share may cause the price-cost margin to
go up.  Indeed, the econometric results of the study show that a decline in labor’s income
share  caused  price-cost  margin  in  Turkish  manufacturing  to  increase.  In  this  study,
instead of taking wage share as an explanatory variable, the deviation of labor’s income
share from estimated elasticity is used. The rationale for constructing the explanatory
variable  in  this  manner  is  that  capital-labor  substitution  may  lead  to  changes  in  the
income  share  of  labor  and  this  effect  needs  to  be  netted  out  since  capital  intensity
(represented by labor productivity) is already included in the model.
It may be mentioned in this context that there is a complex relationship between
protection to domestic industry and the income of labor employed in the industry. An
important issue is how the rents associated with the protected trade/industrial regime are10
distributed between laborers and producers. Needless to say that trade union strength
should  be  an  important  determinant  of  the  portion  of  the  rent  accruing  to  labor.
8
Inasmuch as trade liberalization reduces or eliminates the rent accruing to labor, it would
have a depressing effect on the wage rate. 
9  A reduction in labor’s share in the rent (shift
of rent from laborers to producers), say caused by weakening of bargaining power of
trade  unions,  would  have  a  favorable  effect  on  profitability  of  firms  in  concentrated
industries.
10
III.2  Model Estimation
Having discussed the model, we turn to the estimation. As mentioned earlier, for
the  econometric  analysis,  we  use  panel  data  for  137  industries  for  18  years.  Two
commonly used ‘panel data’ models are the Fixed-effects model and the Random-effects
model. For this study, we have used the Kmenta model
11 which is based on Generalized
Least Squares (GLS) and corrects for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, a feature of
panel data sets (the details of the model are provided in Annex B). We have carried out
the necessary tests and found that the application of the Kmenta model is justified (test
results reported in Annex B).
12  Since the final panel data set used is unbalanced, we have
applied unbalanced panel data estimation method.
III.3  Data and Variables
The basic source of data for this study is the Annual Survey of Industry (ASI)
published by the Central Statistical Organization, Government of India. Data for three-
                                                
8  See Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Borjas and Ramey (1995), among others.
9  A number of studies have examined how trade liberalization affects wages in industries of developing
countries through elimination/reduction in rents accruing to labor.  See, for instance, Revenga (1997).
Goldar (2003) has examined this issue in the context of Indian manufacturing industries.
10  There  have  been  several  studies  on  the  effect  of  union  power  on  profitability  (see,  for  instance,
Freeman, 1983; and Dobbelaere, 2003) and how trade liberalization may affect union power (see, for
instance, Dumont, et al., 2003).
11  See Kmenta (1986).
12  Note further that since industrial concentration is captured by a dummy variable (DCON) which does
not vary over time, the fixed-effects model cannot be applied.11
digit industries for the period 1980-81 to 1997-98 have been taken.
13  Though the data are
available for 152 three-digit industrial groups, the study includes only 137 groups. The
remaining groups have been excluded because in these the value of products is reported
to be zero or very low in comparison with value added. Since these are service-oriented
industries, their profitability might not have been affected by removal of import barriers
on  manufactured  products.  Accordingly,  it  was  felt  that  such  industries  should  be
excluded from the analysis. Thus, we had 2466 observations on 137 industries for 18
years. But, subsequently we dropped six observations where the ratio of emoluments to
value added is abnormally high (greater than 5) leaving us with 2460 observations. One
observation is also lost for each industry when we use the variable output growth rate for
econometric analysis.
The variable PCM is computed as gross value added minus emoluments, divided
by the value of gross output. Labor productivity (LP) is computed as gross value added at
constant prices divided by number of employees. Growth rate of industry (GRI) is the
annual growth rate in deflated value of gross output. For value added and gross output,
the same deflator has been used. For each industry, we have used as deflator the best
available wholesale price index series we could obtain from the official series on Index
Number of Wholesale Prices.
The main data source on tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (percentage import
coverage by quantitative restrictions) is a research project undertaken at the ICRIER, the
result of which are reported in Das (2003a).  For a majority of three-digit industries, data
on import barriers could be obtained from this source. Since Das has not covered all
three-digit industries, it has been necessary to use other sources. Tariff rates and non-
tariff barriers at the level of industrial groups (66 sectors of Input-Output table) have been
taken form Goldar and Saleem (1992), NCAER (2000) and Nouroz (2001). In a number
of cases, the estimate available for an input-output sector has been applied to all three-
                                                
13  The Economic and Political Weekly has created a systematic, electronic database using ASI results for
the period 1973-74 to 1997-98.  Concordance has been worked out between the industrial classifications
used till 1988-89 and that used thereafter (NIC-1970 and NIC-1987), and comparable series for various
three- and two-digit industries have been prepared. We have used this database for our study.12
digit industries belonging to that sector. It has also been necessary to interpolate the tariff
rates or import coverage ratios, as these are not available for all the years of the period
under study. For some industries, the import coverage ratio is not available for years prior
to 1988-89. For such industries, the figure for 1988-89 has been applied for all earlier
years of the 1980s. This should not introduce any serious error in the data on non-tariff
barriers,  as  quantitative  restrictions  covered  a  very  high  proportion  of  imports  of
manufactures throughout the decade.
14
To obtain deviation of labor income share from the elasticity of value added with
respect  to  labor,  a  Translog  production  function  has  been  estimated.  The  estimated
production function is given in Annex C.  Real gross value added is taken as the measure
of output, number of employees as the measure of labor input and gross fixed capital
stock at constant price as the measure of capital input.
15  Given the estimated production
function,  the  logarithmic  derivative  of  value  added  with  respect  to  labor  yields  the
required elasticity, which varies across observations. The income share of labor in gross
value added is compared with this elasticity and the deviation is computed.
As mentioned earlier, we use a dummy variable, DCON, in the model to capture
the  effect  of  market  power  on  profitability.  DCON  is  assigned  value  one  for  the  23
industries  for  which  Kambhampati’s  estimates  indicate  high  level  of  concentration,
otherwise it is assigned value zero.
                                                
14  For aggregate manufacturing, the proportion of imports covered by quantitative restrictions was about
90 per cent in 1988-89.
15  Construction of real fixed capital stock series for each of the 137 industries would be an enormous task.
For a research project undertaken at the ICRIER, real fixed capital series were constructed for 41 major
industrial groups using the perpetual inventory method. We have taken the estimated capital stock series
for each group and proportionately allocated the capital stock estimates among the constituent three-
digit industries according to book-value of fixed assets reported in the ASI.13
IV  Empirical Results
IV.1  Analysis of trends in price-cost margin and labor income
Analysis of price-cost margin at the aggregate level reveals that there was no fall
in  the  price-cost  margin  after  1991  when  the  process  of  trade  and  industrial  reforms
began. Rather, the margin seems to have increased in the post-reform period. This is
broadly in agreement with the findings of Srivastava et al. (2001). It may also be noted
that the price-cost margin in the post-reform period exceeded the level predicted by a
simple trend line fitted to the series on the margin for the period 1973-74 to 1990-91 (see
Figure 1).  On the other hand, there has been a significant fall in the income share of
labor in value added.
16 The labor share in the 1990s was much lower than the expected
level indicated by the previous trend (Figure 1).  This suggests the possibility that the fall
in labor’s share in value added may have helped prevent a slide in the average profit
margin in Indian industries in the post-reform period.
                                                
16  The fact that the income share of labor in Indian industries has fallen sharply in the 1990s has drawn
attention of researchers. See, for instance, Unel (2003).
Fig. 1: Price cost margin and wage share in gross value added, 






































A comparison of price-cost margin between the pre- and post-reform period at the
level of two-digit industries is presented in Table 1. The table brings out that the price-
cost margin in the post-reform period exceeded the average margin in the period 1973-74
to 1990-91 in most industries. Also, in most cases, it exceeded the level predicted by the
past trend. The increase in price-cost margin in the 1990s as compared to the 1970s and
1980s  was  particularly  marked  in  the  following  industries:  Beverages  and  tobacco
products  (industry  code  22),  Textile  products  including  readymade  garments  (26),
Leather and leather products (29), Chemicals and chemical products (30), and Rubber,
plastic, petroleum and coal products (31).
 Table 1: Price cost margin in Indian manufacturing, two-digit industries,
                                                        1973-74 to 1997-98
Industry
code














20-21 Food products 7.7 9.0 9.4 9.8
22 Beverage & tobacco 15.5 21.0 22.3 16.1
23 Cotton textiles 9.8 9.9 9.9 8.7
24 Wool, silk and manmade
fibre textiles
13.8 15.6 14.9 13.5
25 Jute textiles 5.0 3.9 4.0 -0.9
26 Textile products 11.2 18.3 16.6 15.3
27 Wood, wood products,
furniture
13.5 15.6 16.5 12.4
28 Paper, paper products,
printing and publishing
16.6 16.8 16.0 12.6
29 Leather, leather products 7.8 12.9 11.6 10.2
30 Chemicals, chemical products 17.3 21.4 22.4 14.9
31 Rubber, plastic, petroleum
and coal products
10.5 14.6 14.0 11.3
32 Non-metallic mineral
products
18.2 21.6 22.1 23.0
33 Basic metals and alloys 13.1 15.8 18.3 11.9
34 Metal products 14.2 14.1 14.4 14.3
35 Machinery 16.4 16.9 17.5 14.9
36 Machinery 16.3 18.3 17.3 17.1
37 Transport equipment 13.8 15.0 16.5 13.6
38 Other manufacturing 18.3 18.0 16.9 20.3
Source: based on ASI data.
Note: Price-cost margin = (gross value added minus total emoluments)/value of output15
Table 2 gives the profile of industries according to price-cost margin (PCM), in
respect of the 137 three-digit industrial groups covered in the study. We find that among
the industries which had less than 15 percent PCM in 1980s, 19.54 percent (17 out of 87)
recorded a fall in PCM in 1990s. The relevant proportion is 32.5 percent for industries
which had PCM between 15 to 20 percent, and 50 percent for industries which had PCM
above 20 percent. It is evident therefore that the decline in PCM in 1990s was relatively
more common in industries which had higher PCM in 1980s. By contrast, among the
industries that had very low PCM in 1980s (i.e. below 5 percent), no industry recorded a
decline, perhaps because there was hardly any potential for further decline.






No. of industries in
which PCM declined
in the 1990s
No. of industries in which
growth rate of production
declined in the 1990s
Less than
5%
3 - 2 (66.6%)
5 to 10 % 31 6 (19.35%) 14 (45.16%)
10 to 15% 53 11(20.75%) 22 (41.51%)
Below15 % 87 17 (19.54%) 38 (43.68%)
15 to 20% 40 13 (32.5%) 19 (47.5%)
Above 20% 10 5 (50%) 4(40%)
Above 15% 50 18 (36%) 23 (46%)
Total 137 35 (25.54%) 61 (44.52%)
Out of the 137 industries studied, 61 (or 44.5 percent) experienced a fall in the
growth rate of output (real) in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. The proportion was
43.7 percent (38 industries out of 87) among the industries with relatively low PCM in
1980s  (below  15  percent).  The  proportion  was  marginally  higher  at  46  percent  for
industries that had a relatively higher price-cost margin in the 1980s (above 15 percent).
Figure  2  shows  a  plot  of  change  in  labor  share  in  gross  value  added  against
change in price-cost margin between 1989-90 and 1997-98 for three-digit industries. The
correlation coefficient is  –0.67. It would be noticed that in a large number of industries16
there was an increase in the price-cost margin between 1989-90 and 1997-98. In most
cases, this was associated with a fall in the income share of labor in value added. Thus,
we find evidence that provides some support to our conjecture that the observed increase
in the price-cost margin in Indian industries at the aggregate level in the 1990s is mainly
due to a fall in labor’s income share.
In a recent paper, Balakrishnan and Suresh Babu (2003) have noted that in the
post-reform period there has been an almost across-the-board increase in the price-cost
margin in Indian industries at the two-digit level (see Table 3 which reproduces the ratios
computed by them).  They also note that the share of wages in value added has declined
in the post-reform period in all the two-digit industries and hence at the aggregate level.
Accordingly, they conclude that there has been a  relative shift of income away  from
workers towards profit earners. This is consistent with the trends in price-cost margin and
labor share observed in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Figure 2: changes in wage share and price-cost margin, Indian 
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It is worth noting in this context that there has been a deceleration in the growth
of real product wage of industrial workers in the post reform period.
17 The growth rate in
product wage at the aggregate manufacturing level was 3.52 per cent per annum during
the period 1973-74 to 1990-91 which declined to 2.91 per cent per annum during the
period 1991-92 to 1999-00 (Balakrishnan and Suresh Babu, 2003:4002). The deceleration
in the growth of real wages (money wages deflated by the consumer price index for
industrial workers) has been sharper. The  growth rate in  real  wages  at  the  aggregate
manufacturing level was 2.99 per cent per annum during the period 1973-74 to 1990-91,
and  it  declined  to  0.37  per  cent  per  annum  during  the  period  1991-92  to  1999-00
(Balakrishnan and Suresh Babu, 2003:4003).  In nearly half of the two-digit industries,
there was a fall in real wages in the 1990s. These trends in real product wage and real
wages are consistent with the observed decline in the income share of labor in the post-
reform period.
                                                
17  Goldar (2003) has examined the causes of the fall in the growth rate of real product wage in Indian
industries in the 1990s.18
Table 3: Price-cost margin and wage share in Indian manufacturing, two-digit
industries, 1973-74 to 1999-00
Industry
code













20-21 Food products 7.66 8.89 23.46 18.88
22 Beverage & tobacco 15.51 21.32 26.98 19.52
23 to 25 Textiles 10.58 11.45 46.04 32.52
26 Textile products 11.15 17.61 26.86 17.07
27 Wood, wood products,
furniture
13.55 15.54 29.96 23.62
28 Paper, paper products,
printing and publishing
16.57 16.31 29.01 21.50
29 Leather, leather products 7.71 12.47 34.76 21.20
30 Chemicals, chemical
products
17.27 21.62 14.80 9.78
31 Rubber, plastic, petroleum
and coal products
10.48 14.19 13.68 9.87
32 Non-metallic mineral
products
18.16 21.60 25.32 15.49
33 Basic metals and alloys 13.09 16.15 26.61 15.88
34 Metal products 14.21 13.82 27.94 21.62
35+36 Machinery 16.41 16.84 22.37 16.52
37 Transport equipment 13.81 14.71 34.14 23.24
38 Other manufacturing 18.38 17.23 26.33 16.99
All manufacturing 12.99 15.50 26.59 17.20
Source: Balakrishnan and Suresh Babu (2003)
Notes:
Price-cost margin = (output minus total emoluments and intermediate inputs)/value of output
Wage share = wages/ value added. Note that labor income share shown in Figure 1 is based
on total emoluments which includes income of ‘persons other than workers’.19
IV.2  Estimates of the Kmenta Model
The estimates of the model are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Since both tariff and
non-tariff barriers were reduced in the process of trade reforms, and the inter-temporal
changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers are highly correlated (see Annex D), separate
estimation of the model has been done using tariff and non-tariff barriers as alternate
variables representing import competition (or lack of it).
18   The results obtained by using
tariff rates are reported in Table 4 and those using non-tariff barriers are reported in Table
5.
In addition to the variables listed earlier, a dummy variable D for the post-reform
period has been included in the model. This is expected to capture the influences of
reforms, other than trade reforms.
The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 indicate clearly a positive relationship of
price-cost margin with tariff and non-tariff barriers. The coefficient of tariff rate (TRF) is
statistically  significant  at  one  percent  level  in  all  the  seven  estimates  of  the  model
presented in Table 4. The coefficient of quantitative restrictions variable (QR) is also
statistically significant at one percent level in all estimates of the model presented in
Table 5.   The inference that may be drawn from these results is that lowering of tariff
and non-tariff barriers on imports of manufactures in India in the 1990s had a significant
pro-competitive effect on Indian industries, tending to reduce the profit margins.
                                                
18  In this regard, our analysis is similar to that of Currie and Harrison (1997).20
Table 4: Estimates of the Model Explaining Price-cost Margin in
Indian Industries (using tariff rates)




I II III IV V VI VII
TRF 0.0119* 0.0105* 0.0113* 0.0133* 0.0113* 0.0122* 0.0142*
(t) (4.408) (3.893) (3.939) (4.333) (4.159) (4.243) (4.628)
DWSE -11.176* -11.121* -11.138* -11.211* -10.903* -10.909* -11.003*
(t) (-27.5) (-27.27) (-27.28) (-27.38) (-26.29) (-26.26) (-26.42)
LP 0.075* 0.0073* 0.0074* 0.072* 0.0076* 0.0078* 0.0075*
(t) (17.85) (17.64) (17.89) (17.53) (17.85) (18.19) (17.69)
GRI -0.0095* -0.0095* -0.00946*
(t) (-7.07) (-7.098) (-7.056)
DCON 0.3684 1.7524* 0.4585 2.04*
(t) (1.153) (2.557) (1.412) (2.967)
TRF*DCON -0.00078 -0.0127* -0.00067 -0.0144*
(t) (-0.277) (-2.104) (-0.2338) (-2.38)
D -0.5667* -0.5564* -0.5570* -0. 5649* -0.5461* -0.5431* -0.5595*
(t) (-3.180) (-3.116) (-3.12) (-3.165) (-3.051) (-3.034) (-3.123)
CONSTANT 7.6909* 7.7139 7.7087 7.4744* 7.6569 7.6354 7.4141
(t) (22.89) (23.09) (22.87) (20.78) (22.38) (22.16) (20.22)
R
2
OE 0.7560 0.7563 0.7584 0.7595 0.7607 0.7627 0.7650
DW 1.9972 1.9883 1.9886 1.9904 1.9817 1.9828 1.9843
No. of
observations
2460 2460 2460 2460 2323 2323 2323
t-ratios in brackets, * = statistically significant at 1%, ** = statistically significant at 5%,
*** = statistically significant at 10%
TRF= tariff rate, DWSE= deviation of share of wages and salaries in value added from estimated elasticity
of output with respect to labor, LP= labor productivity, GRI= growth rate of industry, DCON= dummy
variable for highly concentrated industries, D= a dummy variable for the post reform period.21
Table 5: Estimates of the Model Explaining Price-cost Margin in
            Indian Industries (using non-tariff barriers)




I II III IV V VI
QR 0.0107* 0.00936* 0.00767* 0.00929* 0.00739** 0.00748**
(t) (3.755) (3.262) (2.604) (3.233) (2.508) (2.432)
DWSE -11.223* -11.14* -11.114* -10.938* -10.92* -10.918*
(t) (-27.56) (-27.27) (-27.21) (-26.21) (-26.19) (-26.19)
LP 0.074* 0.072* 0.00725* 0.00747* 0.0075* 0.00753*
(t) (17.74) (17.43) (17.48) (17.50) (17.55) (17.57)
GRI -0.00989* -0.00989* -0.0099*
(t) (-7.265) (-7.277) (-7.289)
DCON 0.6434** 0.7754** 0.00346
(t) (2.097) (2.485) (0.00535)
QR*DCON 0.0086** 0.0101* 0.00989
(t) (2.48) (2.849) (1.345)
D -0.5834* -0.5623* -0.5659* -0.5857* -0.5911* -0.5984*
(t) (-3.223) (-3.108) (-3.129) (-3.248) (-3.279) (-3.317)
CONSTANT 8.0066* 7.9584 8.0792 8.0332 8.1656 8.1644
(t) (25.3) (24.78) (25.44) (24.88) (25.57) (24.63)
R
2
OE 0.7643 0.7635 0.7621 0.7689 0.7665 0.7659
DW 1.9826 1.9731 1.9743 1.9675 1.9696 1.9702
No. of
observations
2460 2460 2460 2323 2323 2323
t-ratios in brackets, * = statistically significant at 1%, ** = statistically significant at 5%,
*** = statistically significant at 10%
QR= quantitative restrictions (import coverage), DWSE= deviation of share of wages and salaries in value
added from estimated elasticity of output with respect to labor, LP= labor productivity, GRI= growth rate
of industry, DCON= dummy variable for highly concentrated industries, D= a dummy variable for the post
reform period.22
The coefficient of the dummy variable representing highly concentrated industries
(DCON) is consistently positive and statistically significant at five percent level or better
in some of the estimates of the model presented in Tables 4 and 5. The finding of a
positive  relationship  between  industrial  concentration  and  price-cost  margin  or
profitability is consistent with theoretical expectations and in agreement with the results
of Kambhampati (1996) and Rao (2001). The interaction term between tariff rate and
concentration dummy has a negative coefficient (contrary to what is expected) while the
interaction term between QR and concentration dummy has a positive and statistically
significant coefficient. It may be inferred accordingly that the removal of quantitative
restrictions  on  imports  had  a  much  stronger  effect  on  the  profitability  of  highly
concentrated industries than the lowering of tariff rates. Another inference that may be
drawn from the results is that the trade liberalization had a relatively stronger effect on
profitability of highly concentrated industries than on profitability of other industries.
A significant positive relationship is found between labor productivity (LP) and
price-cost  margin.  Such  a  relationship  is  obviously  expected.  On  the  other  hand,  a
significant  negative  relationship  is  found  between  growth  rate  of  industry  (GRI)  and
price-cost margin. The results in respect of GRI are at variance with the results of Rao
(2001) but are in line with the results obtained by Ghose (1975).
The  post-reform  dummy  (D)  has  a  negative  and  statistically  significant
coefficient. This is perhaps a reflection of pro-competitive effects of reforms other than
trade reforms (e.g., industrial reforms, and easing of restrictions on entry of foreign direct
investment).
As mentioned earlier, the deviation of labor income share in value added from the
elasticity of output with respect to labor has been included in the model to capture the
effect  of  inter-temporal  changes  in  labor’s  income  share  on  profitability  of  industrial
firms.  The  coefficient  of  this  variable  is  negative  and  statistically  significant  at  one
percent level in all the estimates of the model presented in Tables 4 and 5. The mean
value of DWSE for the post-reform period is about 17 percentage points lower than that23
of the pre-reform period.  It seems therefore that a fall in labor’s income share in the post-
reform period neutralized to a large extent the pro-competitive effects of trade reforms
and other reforms.
To check the robustness of the model estimates, the model has been estimated
separately for consumer goods industries and intermediate and capital goods industries.
The 137 industries covered in the study have been divided into two groups: Consumer
goods (84 industries) and intermediate and capital goods (53 industries). The estimates of
the Kmenta model for intermediate and capital goods are shown in Tables 6 and 7, and
those for consumer goods are shown in Tables 8 and 9.  The model estimates for the two
groups of industries are found to be quite similar to the results reported in Tables 4 and 5
based on the entire sample and thus raise our confidence in the results.
While  the  model  results  for  the  consumer  goods  industries  are  by  and  large
similar  to  those  for  the  intermediate  and  capital  goods  industries,  there  are  some
indications from the results that the effect of tariff reduction on the price-cost margin was
relatively  less  for  consumer  goods  industries  than  for  intermediate  and  capital  goods
industries.  The same applies to the effect of ‘other reforms’ captured by the post-reform
dummy variable, D.  It would be noticed that the coefficients of tariff rate are relatively
lower for the estimates for consumer goods industries.  Given that a high level of QR was
maintained for the consumer goods long after the reforms began in 1991, the relatively
low impact of tariff changes is expected. A simple comparison of average PCM shows
that in intermediate and capital goods industries the average PCM increased from 16
percent in the pre-reform period to 17.6 percent in the post-reform period. In consumer
goods industries, by contrast, the average PCM increased from 13.4 percent in the pre-
reform  period  to  16.6  percent  in  the  post-reform  period.  This  is  consistent  with  the
finding of a lower impact of tariff reform on PCM for consumer goods industries.24
    Table 6: Estimates of the Model Explaining Price-cost Margin in Intermediate
and Capital Goods Industries (using tariff rates)




I II III IV V VI
TRF 0.0197* 0.0202* 0.0204* 0.02268* 0.02084* 0.02099*
(t) ((4.108) (4.124) (4.048) (4.364) (4.357) (4.297)
DWSE -15.84* -15.784* -15.798* -15.862* -15.295* -15.297*
(t) (-21.25) (-20.92) (-21.02) (-21.03) (-20.76) (-20.83)
LP 0.00818* 0.00786* 0.00819* 0.00762* 0.00847* 0.00882*
(t) (11.41) (10.54) (11.03) (10.20) (11.35) (11.86)
GRI -0.00762* -0.00771*
(t) (-4.346) (-4.432)
DCON 2.9270* 4.8051* 3.4099*
(t) (3.747) (3.219) (4.671)
TRF*DCON 0.00158 -0.0172 0.004248
(t) (0.1833) (-1.154) (0.4966)
D -1.1806* -1.1207* -1.1399* -1.135* -0.9817* -0.9997*
(t) (-4.145) (-3.891) (-3.954) (-3.945) (-3.490) (-3.555)
CONSTANT 6.5735 6.5553 6.5512 6.4273 6.3347 6.3555
(t) (12.47) (12.22) (12.12) (11.66) (11.91) (11.89)
R
2
OE 0.8248 0.8081 0.8076 0.8119 0.8171 0.8161
DW 2.01 1.997 1.998 2.0 1.9765 1.9749
No. of
observations
953 953 953 953 900 900
t-ratios in brackets, * = statistically significant at 1%, ** = statistically significant at 5%,
 *** = statistically significant at 10% , TRF= tariff rate,
DWSE= deviation of share of wages and salaries in value added from estimated elasticity of output with
respect to labor, LP= labor productivity, GRI= growth rate of industry,
 DCON= dummy variable for highly concentrated industries, D= a dummy variable for the post-reform
period.25
 Table 7: Estimates of the Model Explaining Price-cost Margin in Intermediate and
                   Capital Goods Industries (using non-tariff barriers)




I II III IV V VI
QR 0.0136* 0.01303* 0.0134* 0.01468* 0.0118* 0.0118*
(t) (3.763) (3.509) (3.508) (3.751) (3.272) (3.175)
DWSE -15.946* -15.887* -15.946* -15.868* -15.393* -15.426*
(t) (-21.1) (-20.80) (-21.00) (-20.74) (-20.54) (-20.64)
LP 0.0077* 0.00756* 0.00785* 0.00762* 0.00813* 0.008385*
(t) (10.82) (10.06) (10.57) (10.07) (10.80) (11.24)
GRI -0.00826* -0.00832*
(t) (-4.665) (-4.743)
DCON 3.1081* 4.1303* 3.6823*
(t) (4.387) (3.318) (5.664)
QR*DCON -0.0020 -0.00893 0.00193
(t) (-0.2659) (-0.7175) (0.2510)
D -1.1323 -1.0731* -1.0801* -1.0817* -0.970* -0.9873*
(t) (-3.826) (-3.566) (-3.595) (-3.561) (-3.323) (-3.378)
CONSTANT 7.2623 7.2886 7.2715 7.1680 7.2047 7.267
(t) (16.98) (16.60) (16.49) (15.84) (16.75) (16.86)
R
2
OE 0.8513 0.8254 0.8260 0.8325 0.8296 0.8258
DW 1.99 1.985 1.986 1.9852 1.9606 1.9565
No. of
observations
953 953 953 953 900 900
t-ratios in brackets, * = statistically significant at 1%, ** = statistically significant at 5%,
*** = statistically significant at 10%,
QR= quantitative restrictions (import coverage), DWSE= deviation of share of wages and
salaries in value added from estimated elasticity of output with respect to labor, LP=
labor productivity, GRI= growth rate of industry, DCON= dummy variable for highly
concentrated industries, D= a dummy variable for the post reform period.26
Table 8: Estimates of the Model Explaining Price-cost Margin in
consumer goods industries (using tariff rates)




I II III IV V VI
TRF 0.0128* 0.0126* 0.01* 0.0113* 0.0129* 0.0102*
(t) (3.576) (3.518) (2.686) (2.768) (3.511) (2.644)
DWSE -8.6008* -8.6523* -8.5988* -8.5592 -8.5766* -8.5194*
(t) (-17.15) (-17.25) (-17.15) (-17.04) (-16.51) (-16.42)
LP 0.0077* 0.0077* 0.0077* 0.00775* 0.0080* 0.008*
(t) (15.32) (15.43) (15.40) (15.42) (15.18) (15.13)
GRI -0.0114* -0.0114*
(t) (-6.223) (-6.21)
DCON 1.0782** 0.7524 1.1037**
(t) (2.481) (0.8235) (2.516)
TRF*DCON 0.00989* 0.0035 0.00954**
(t) (2.582) (0.4385) (2.489)
D -0.2068 -0.21324 -0.232 -0.2178 -0.2857 -0.3076
(t) (-0.8614) (-0.8884) (-0.9684) (-0.9068) (-1.153) (-1.242)
CONSTANT 7.2937 6.9886 7.2890 7.1301 7.1342 7.4792
(t) (15.58) (14.54) (15.61) (13.71) (14.15) (15.27)
R
2
OE 0.6559 0.6557 0.6582 0.6575 0.6632 0.666
DW 2.00 2.02 2.01 2.01 2.00 2.00
No. of
observations
1507 1507 1507 1507 1423 1423
t-ratios in brackets, * = statistically significant at 1%, ** = statistically significant at 5%,
*** = statistically significant at 10%
TRF=  tariff  rate,  DWSE=  deviation  of  share  of  wages  and  salaries  in  value  added  from  estimated
elasticity of output with respect to labor, LP= labor productivity, GRI= growth rate of industry, DCON=
dummy variable for highly concentrated industries, D= a dummy variable for the post reform period.27
Table 9: Estimates of the Model Explaining Price-cost Margin in
consumer goods industries (using non-tariff barriers)




I II III IV V
QR 0.0113** 0.01358* 0.0079*** 0.01413* 0.00779
(t) (2.750) (2.878) (1.635) (2.853) (1.538)
DWSE -8.2892* -8.3438* -8.3076* -8.281* -8.2468*
(t) (-16.58) (-16.67) (-16.8) (-15.95) (-15.96)
LP 0.0077* 0.0077* 0.0077* 0.008* 0.0079*







D -0.0287 -0.28252 -0.2709 -0.3665 -0.3533
(t) (-1.219) (-1.195) (-1.150) (-1.512) (-1.462)
CONSTANT 7.5844 7.1658 7.5086 7.3243 7.7228
(t) (15.51) (13.97) (15.32) (13.62) (15.01)
R
2
OE 0.6602 0.6636 0.6716 0.6688 0.6781
DW 1.984 1.9897 1.9942 1.9827 1.9847
No. of
observations
1507 1507 1507 1423 1423
t-ratios in brackets, * = statistically significant at 1%, ** = statistically significant at 5%,
*** = statistically significant at 10%
QR= quantitative restrictions (import coverage), DWSE= deviation of share of wages and salaries in value
added from estimated elasticity of output with respect to labor, LP= labor productivity, GRI= growth rate
of industry, DCON= dummy variable for highly concentrated industries, D= a dummy variable for the post
reform period.28
V  Conclusion
A  number  of  studies  for  developing  countries  have  found  that  import
liberalization  leads  to  a  reduction  in  price-cost  margins  or  markups  in  imperfectly
competitive industries. While the Krishna-Mitra study for Indian industries did find this
pro-competitive  effect  of  trade  liberalization,  a  later,  more  comprehensive  study
undertaken by Srivastava and associates, applying the same methodology, did not find a
general fall in markups in Indian industries in the post-reform period. A more recent
study on the same subject by Kambhampati and Parikh also does not find strong evidence
of pro-competitive effects of trade reforms.
In this study, a model for explaining price-cost margin was estimated from panel
data for 137 three-digit industries for the period 1980-81 to 1997-98. The analysis is
different from the analysis in the three studies mentioned above in that the tariff and non-
tariff barriers were included among the explanatory variables.  The results of the analysis
clearly indicate that the lowering of tariff rates and removal of quantitative restrictions on
imports of manufactures had a significant pro-competitive effect on Indian industries,
tending to reduce the markups or price-cost margins. This was, however, offset by some
other influences. The results of the analysis suggest that there was a significant reduction
in labor’s share in value added in the post-reform period (beyond what can be explained
by changes in capital intensity), and this helped prevent the slide in the price-cost margin
in Indian industries.
What caused an accelerated fall in the income share of labor in manufacturing in
the  post-reform  period  is  a  moot  question.  It  seems  this  may  have  an  important
connection with the bargaining power of unions. Goldar (2003) has presented empirical
evidence to argue that the unions have become weaker in the post-reform period and this
is one of the reasons for a slowdown in the growth rate of real product wage in organized
manufacturing in the 1990s.  Tendulkar (2004) points out that the organized labor market
has been in a state of flux during the post-reform period. While the formal rules of the
game incorporated in the protective labor legislation continue to persist, intensification of29
domestic  and  external  competition  is  forcing  the  existing  industrial  units  to  seek  out
informal  avenues  of  flexibility  in  labor  allocation  (including  taking  recourse  to
outsourcing of jobs and allowing flexi-time). He notes further that with the opening up of
the economy and rising fiscal deficits of the states, public investment has been declining
and so has been the central support for state capital expenditures. The state governments
have  thus  been  forced  to  look  for  private  domestic  and  foreign  investment  for
employment generation as well as revenues. This has probably made state governments
take a softer stand in the matter of labor regulation.  Certain state governments have
started granting mandatory permissions for restructuring, retrenchment and closure more
liberally than earlier.30
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Annex A: Estimates of mark-up obtained by Srivastava et al. (2001)
The  estimates  of  mark-up  and  change  in  mark-up  between  the  pre-  and  post-
reform periods obtained in the study undertaken by Srivastava et al. (2001) are shown in
the table below.





Food products 0.89 (50.9) 0.23 (7.03)
Tobacco products 0.38 (6.4) 0.28 (0.9)
Textiles 1.00 (79.6) -0.03 (-1.2)
Leather products 0.67 (9.3) 0.45 (5.5)
Wood products 1.30 (16.2) 0.22 (1.2)
Paper products 1.15 (49.7) -0.32 (-5.7)
Publishing and printing 0.94 (13.5) 0.44 (4.3)
Chemical products 1.02 (82.5) 0.09 (3.6)
Rubber and plastic products 0.96 (33.7) 0.13 (2.4)
Non-metallic mineral products 1.34 (34.0) -0.33 (-5.2)
Basic metal products 1.19 (54.6) -0.18 (-4.6)
Fabricated metal products 1.10 (69.8) 0.03 (1.2)
Machinery and equipment 1.09 (74.0) 0.03 (1.2)
Electrical machinery 1.28 (40.9) -0.25 (-4.3)
Motor vehicles 1.21 (58.1) 0.07 (1.7)
Other transport equipment 1.04 (24.1) 0.18 (1.0)




Note: The methodology proposed by Hall (1988, 1990) has bee applied in the study to estimate mark-ups.
The estimates based on unbalanced panel obtained by the fixed-effects model are presented in the table.
Company-level data for the period 1980 to 1997 are used. Total observations used are 24,463. The figures
in parentheses are t-ratios.
# Estimates for balanced panel using about 8,000 observations.
Source: Prepared from Srivastava et al. (2001).35
Annex B: Estimation of Panel Data Models
A panel data model is written as:
Yit = Xit   + Zi  +  it
Where Y is the dependent variable and the subscript i represents individuals or groups,
while the subscript t denotes time. There are k regressors in Xit, not including a constant
term.  The  individual  effect  is  Zi   where  Zi  contains  a  constant  term  and  a  set  of
individual or group specific variables, which may be observed or unobserved but all of
which are taken to be constant over time ‘t’. The model is basically a classical regression
model.  Based  on  the  assumptions  of  the  model  one  can  apply  different  estimation
techniques.
1. Pooled Regression: If Zi contains only a constant term, then the OLS (Ordinary Least
6TXDUHVSURYLGHVFRQVLVWHQWDQGHIILFLHQWHVWLPDWHVRIWKHFRPPRQLQWHUFHSW DQGVORSH
YHFWRU 
2. Fixed Effects Model (FE or Least Squares Dummy Variable Model): This model
assumes  that  differences  across  cross-sections  can  be  captured  in  differences  in  the
constant term.
Yit = Xit   i +  it     where   i = Z i
i  differs  across  cross-section  units.  So  Zi  is  unobserved  but  correlated  with  Xit.    It
follows  that  i  is  group  specific  constant  term  and  does  not  vary  over  time.  Group
specific does not mean that it is non-stochastic.  it has the properties of the  classical
PRGHODQG2/6LVDSSOLHGIRUHVWLPDWLRQ7KHIL[HGHIIHFWHVWLPDWRURI LVJHQHUDOO\
viewed as an OLS regression of means-differenced variable and is therefore also known
as a ‘within group’ estimator. That is, it uses only the variation within an individual’s set
of observations.36
3.  Random Effect Model (RE or Error Component Model): This approach assumes a
single constant term, which is the mean of the unobserved heterogeneity E (Zi DQGWKH
model can be estimated by generalized least squares (GLS).
Yit = Xit    +  i +  it
So Zi    +  i.   i is a group specific random element specific to observations relating to
the ith individual or group and is constant through time. It is uncorrelated with Xit.  it has
the properties of the classical model and GLS is applied for estimation. A few important
assumptions about  i and  it are as follows:







The choice between fixed effect and random effect can be made with the help of the
Hausman test, which is based on the premise that the FE and RE statistics should not
differ systematically. It is a Chi-square test based on the Wald criterion. The choice also
depends  on  whether  one  has  to  make  inferences  in  respect  of  the  population  (RE)
characteristics or only with respect to the effects that are there in the sample (FE). Fixed
effect is costly in terms of degrees of freedom lost.  Another problem with FE is that one
cannot include in the model variables that vary across individuals or groups but take the
same value over time. In such a model, estimates of  i will be inconsistent.
4.  The  Time  wise  Autoregressive  Cross–Sectional  Heteroscedastic  Disturbance
Approach (Kmenta’s Pooled Model):
This  technique  assumes  the  same  slopes  and  same  intercept  across  cross-section
observations and it corrects for autoregression (time wise) and heteroscedasticity (cross-
sectional).
Y it = X it b +  it  for i=1, 2,……N        t=1,2,………T37




E (  it  jt) = 0  for i  j  (cross-section independence)
 it =  i  it – 1 + Vit (autoregression)
and  E (vit) = 0; E (vit
2) = pi
2
E (vit, vjs) = 0 for i  j and t  s
            E ( it – 1, vjt) = 0
The estimate for b is obtained by a generalized least square (GLS) procedure. The
estimation procedure involves the following steps:
Step I : estimate b by OLS and obtain estimated residuals eit.
Step II: the estimated residuals are used to compute  $ Si  as estimates of   i. .
Step III: Use the  $ Si’s to transform the observations, including the first observation and
apply OLS to the transformed variable.
Step IV: Obtain the GLS estimator.
For the non-autocorrelated models, the estimates may be two-step GLS or iterated GLS,
which  produces  a  maximum  likelihood  estimator  (MLE).  For  the  models  with
autocorrelation,  the  estimator  may  be  three-step  GLS  or  iterated  GLS,  which  though
convergent, does not produce the MLE.
The Durbin-Watson statistics is calculated as:
          N   T            N  T
          vit- vi,t-1) 
2  Yit
2
         i=1 t=2          i=1 t=138
An advantage of this model is that no restrictive assumptions are made about  it.
Also, all the dummies, (especially the time invariant ones like DCON in our analysis) can
be introduced which is not feasible in the FE models.
Choice among techniques
The choice of an appropriate estimation technique is made on the basis of Hsiao’s
(1986, pp. 15-17) homogeneity F-tests. The two null hypothesis that were proposed are:
H3: both slope and intercept coefficients are identical; i.e.
                 ai = aj and bi = bj        for j     i
H1: slope coefficients are identical but intercepts are not; i.e.
                 ai  aj but bi = bj             for j     i
H3 is essentially a test of whether the model must be estimated with different slopes and
different intercepts (i.e. OLS to each individual unit) or should we pool the data and
estimate a single equation by the pool model.  If slopes and intercepts are equal, i.e. H3 is
accepted, we pool the data and estimate a single equation by the pool models and no
more testing is required. Hypothesis H1 is a test of equality of slopes. If slopes are not
identical among cross-sectional units (firms, industries or regions), i.e. H1 is rejected,
then FE and RE models are inappropriate (as these are based on the assumption of same
slopes) and the model must be estimated at the level of individual units and the test
sequence is naturally stopped [Hsiao (1986), pp.15]. The test statistics corresponding to
H3 and H1 have been defined as:
    F3 = (S3 – S1) / [(n – 1)(k+1)]
            S1 / [nT –n (k+1)]
and
     F1 = (S2-S1) / (n – 1) k    
             S1/ [nT –n (k+1)]          
where  n = number of cross section groups,39
  T = Time period
S3=Residual sum of squares in a restricted model (Kmenta pooled model;
it assumes same intercepts and same slopes)
S1=  Residual  sum  of  squares  in  an  unrestricted  model  (Least  squares
method to each individual unit)
S2 = Residual sum of squares in a restricted model (fixed effect model,
which assumes same slopes)
     
To conduct these tests, three sets of estimates have to be made: first, estimates of
the  fixed  effects  model,  second,  estimates  of  the  (Kmenta)  pooled  model,  and  third,
estimates of the least squares model (OLS) to each individual unit.
We have carried out the necessary tests and on the basis of the values of S1, S2
and S3 found that the application of the Kmenta pooled model is justified.  The tests for
poolability resulted in insignificant value of F3 (0.928) [and a significant value for F1
(5.729)]. For this study, we have thus used the Kmenta model.  The computations of F3
and F1 are shown below.
S3=109834,       S1=81028, and S2 = 223318
F3 = (109834 – 81028) / [(136)(5)]         = 0.928
81028 / [2460 –137 (5)]
and
 F1 = (223318-81028) / (136)4       = 5.729
          81028 / [2460 –137 (5)]40
Annex  C:  Estimated  Translog  Production  Function  for  Indian  Manufacturing
(Registered)
Dependent variable: ln(V)
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
Ln(L) 0.8445 0.0137  61.47
Ln(K) 0.2452 0.0110  22.27
Ln(L)
2 -0.0601 0.0038 -15.79
Ln(K)
2 -0.0601 0.0038 -15.79
Ln(l)*ln(K) 0.1202 0.0076  15.79
T 0.0258 0.0111  2.32
T
2 0.0002 0.0005  0.39
Constant -2.2103 0.0971 -22.75
F(5,2454) 3343.5
No. of observations 2460
V= real value added; L= labor; K= capital (real fixed capital stock): T= time (year)
Note: The production function is assumed to be homogeneous.
Annex D: Inter-correlation matrix among variables
  PCM TRF QR GRI LP DWSE DCON
PCM 1           
TRF -0.0139 1         
QR -0.04862 0.4839 1       
GRI -0.02752 0.000133 -0.00895 1     
LP 0.2368 -0.11556 -0.23769 0.02458 1   
DWSE -0.1018 0.11089 0.17024 -0.02477 -0.4392 1 
DCON 0.044 0.062354 -0.02669 -0.00674 0.04965 -0.1191 1
PCM= price-cost margin, TRF= tariff rate, DWSE= deviation of share of wages and salaries in
value added from estimated elasticity of output with respect to labor, LP= labor productivity,
GRI= growth rate of industry, QR= quantitative restrictions (import coverage), DCON= dummy
variable for highly concentrated industries.